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JOINT CUSTODY: THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD
In every state, when parents decide to divorce, the court with juris-
diction over the divorce automatically has jurisdiction to determine the
custody of the minor children of the marriage.' Standards used to de-
termine appropriate post-divorce custody arrangements have evolved
over the years, but the customary assumption has been that one parent
would be the sole custodian and the other would be a visitor. At pres-
ent, the preferred custodian is the mother.' Because sole custody gives
the custodian all legal rights to determine the child's upbringing, the
non-custodial parent no longer functions as a parent, altering his rela-
tionship with the child? The presumption of sole custody is being reex-
amined in light of changing family patterns and functions of family
members. As more women work outside the home and men become
more active in childrearing, "[s]hared parental responsibility-joint
1. See Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156,
1323 (1980). The development of the concept of family rights under the Constitution is reviewed;
of particular interest are the sections dealing with family rights in the context of divorce and child
custody. See id. at 1308-50.
In Oklahoma, during marriage, the "father of a legitimate unmarried minor child is entitled
to its custody, services and earnings," OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 5 (1981), but at the time of divorce,
the court is empowered to "make provision for guardianship, custody, support and education of
the minor children," OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1277 (1981). The district court has jurisdiction over the
custody of children whose parents are separated, but not divorced. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 21
(1981). Although the term "custody" is not statutorily defined, it appears to be the rough
equivalent of "guardianship," with which it is used interchangeably in title 30, Guardian and
Ward. Guardianship involves the control and care of a person and his property. OKLa. STAT. tit.
30, §§ 1, 14 (1981).
2. A detailed look at the history of custodial preferences is not within the scope of this
Recent Development. See M. RoMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 22-47 (1978);
Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 351-52 (1979).
3. See Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 271, 295 (1978-79). In awarding custody, judges
typically apply the "best interests of the child" standard. See infra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text. See also Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REv.
523, 553 (1979) (the best interest of the child is "interdependent with and to a large measure a by-
product of the best interest of all family members."). A recent view of the divorce process pro-
poses that, where children are involved, divorce involves a reorganization of the family rather
than its death. The family has an altered physical structure, but also a continuing parent-child
relationship which needs attention. See, e.g., Greif, Joint Custody: A Sociological Study, 15
TRIAL, May 1979, at 32, 33; Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: .4 Study of
Joint Custody, 49(2) AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320, 321 (1979); Bratt, supra, at 302-03. Under
this view, the court's designation of only one parent as custodian "does not take into account the
children's existing attachment to the parent relegated to visitor status." Id. at 296. A custodial
arrangement which best meets the needs of all parties involved should be the objective of the legal
process.
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custody-is very much evident in intact families."4
Attorneys and judges involved in custody decisions should not
only recognize changing family patterns, but should also encourage
and facilitate post-divorce parenting arrangements which accommo-
date particular family relationships. Joint custody offers advantages
that judges and attorneys should consider when making post-divorce
custody decisions. This Recent Development compares joint custody
with other post-divorce custodial arrangements, assesses the advantages
and disadvantages of joint custody, and provides guidelines for judges
and lawyers evaluating the appropriateness of joint custody in particu-
lar circumstances.
I. JOINT CUSTODY
Joint custody may be divided into two concepts, joint legal custody
and joint physical custody. Joint legal custody has been defined as
4. Greif, supra note 3, at 32. See Bratt, supra note 3, at 277-80. Bratt indicates that more
than fifty percent of the female population is in the work force, a fact which alters assignments in
the home, including child care. In addition, there has been a recent increase in the number of
single father-headed homes and an increased involvement of fathers in childrearing in two-parent
homes. See also Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: A Viable Alternative?, 15 TRIAL, May 1979, at 26,
31. The authors point out that while a presumption in favor of the mother "may be warranted in
cases where there has been a part-time father and a full-time mother,.. . it breaks down when
the stereotype is absent because the parents have a different lifestyle." Id. at 27. In the economic
realities of most divorce situations where the single parent must work, the traditional award of
sole custody does not necessarily guarantee the child either a full-time parent or economic secur-
ity. While the percentage of all children living below the poverty line in 1974 was 15.5%, the
percentage of such children in families headed by women was 51.5%. Bratt, supra note 3, at 274
n.14. For divorced, widowed, or separated women with children, the percentage employed
outside the home was significantly greater than in families with the husband present. Id. at 274
n.15.
5. See Bratt, supra note 3, at 281. Although a variety of custodial arrangements are being
tried, only recently has any serious research focused on the problem. See Trombetta, Joint Cus-
tody: Recent Research'and Overloaded Courtrooms Inspire New Solutions to Custody Disputes, 19
J. FAM. L. 213, 215-24 (1980-81); Ramey, Stender & Smaller, Joint Custody: Are 7lVo Homes
Better Than One?, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 559, 569-74 (1979) (This article was heavily relied
on in a recent Oklahoma case. See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.). The existing com-
mentary on custodial arrangements uses such a variety of terms to designate the alternatives and
defines them in so many ways that it is difficult to sort out the advantages or disadvantages of any
particular alternative. Court decisions using a variety of terms make it difficult to identify specific
types of arrangements receiving general judicial support. Because less than ten percent of divorce
cases are contested and, of those, very few are appealed, appellate judicial determination of cus-
tody issues constitutes only a small portion of the actual custody decisions being made. Interview
with Daniel Boudreau, Deborah Shallcross, and Alan Klein, Tulsa District Court Judges (Oct.
1981).
Available literature and court decisions indicate that alternatives to sole custody are expressly
permitted in nineteen states. Some form ofjoint custody may be considered a viable alternative in
most jurisdictions. See 7 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 1151 (Aug. 4, 1981); Foster & Freed, supra note 4,
at 31.
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JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
"each parent shar[ing] in the function of making parental decisions.
The essence of this arrangement is that they continue to share equal
responsibility and authority with respect to their children."'6 Joint
physical custody means the child spends "more or less equal" time with
each parent.7
The significant difference between joint custody and other custody
alternatives is that both parents continue at all times to have legal
rights and responsibilities with regard to the children.' In a sole cus-
tody arrangement, one parent has the entire legal responsibility for the
upbringing of the child.9 The other parent may have to pay a sum of
money periodically to support the child, but all major decisions regard-
ing the health, education, moral, and religious upbringing of the child
are the legal responsibility and right of the custodial parent.
Joint custody also differs from "divided custody," which is prop-
erly a distinct concept.' 0 The distinguishing characteristic of divided
custody is that only one parent at a time exercises legal custody, com-
bined with physical custody. "[E]ach parent lives with the child for a
part of the year with reciprocal visitation privileges. But the parent
with whom the child is living has complete control over the child dur-
ing that period; divided custody involves none of the joint decision
making of Uoint] custody." I Custody may alternate weekly, monthly,
yearly, or on some complicated schedule of days, weeks, months, or
years.' 2 The other parent usually will be allowed visitation privileges,
especially if the custodial periods are in the range of months or years.
"Split custody," yet another distinct concept, involves the splitting
of siblings by awarding sole custody of one or more children to one
parent and the rest to the other parent.' 3 Usually the non-custodial
parent of a particular child has visitation privileges.
Understanding the characteristics of each of these forms of cus-
6. W. WISHARD & L. WISHARD, MEN'S RIGHTS 206 (1980).
7. Id. at 207. Both concepts may be included in one definition. See, e.g., Bratt, supra note
3, at 282-83; Ramey, Stender & Smaller, supra note 5, at 560-61.
8. Roman & Haddad, The Casefor Joint Custody, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1978, at 96,
100.
9. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 525-26.
10. See W. WISHARD & L. WISHARD, supra note 6, at 205-06; Folberg & Graham, supra note
3, at 526-30; Bratt, supra note 3, at 282-83 & n.45. But see In re Marriage of Burham, 283 N.W.2d
269, 272 (Iowa 1979) (treating divided and joint custody as synonymous since both parents have
some legal responsibility in either arrangement).
11. Miller, supra note 2, at 361. See also W. WISHARD & L. WISHARD, supra note 6, at 205.
12. See Bratt, supra note 3, at 282 n.45 (citing several arrangements). Divided custody has
also been called "alternating" custody. See W. WISHARD & L. WISHARD, supra note 6, at 205.
13. See Miller, supra note 2, at 361.
19821
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tody is important in evaluating the comparative advantages and disad-
vantages of joint custody in particular circumstances.
II. JOINT CUSTODY IN OKLAHOMA
Although joint custody is not specifically authorized by statute in
Oklahoma, there is no prohibition against it. The Oklahoma statutes
embody two standards, found in most jurisdictions, for determining
child custody. The first is called the "tender years doctrine," from a
statutory provision that "if the child be of tender years, it should be
given to the mother."' 4 This doctrine and other gender-based criteria
for determining custody of children have been rejected in several other
jurisdictions, either by statutory revision or by court decision.'5 How-
ever, the tender years presumption was upheld by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court in Gordon v. Gordon16 in 1978. Gordon was subse-
quently cited with approval in Boyle v. Boyle, 17 which held that section
11 of title 30 was not "a gender-based discrimination statute."' 8 The
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1981).
In awarding the custody of a minor,.., the court or judge is to be guided by the follow-
ing considerations:
1. By what appears to be for the best interests of the child in respect to its temporal and
its mental and moral welfare; and if the child be of sufficient age to form an intelliient
preference, the court or judge may consider that preference in determining the question.
2. As between parents adversely claiming the custody or guardianship, neither parent is
entitled to it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the child be of tender years, it
should be given to the mother, if it be of an age to require education and preparation for
labor or business, then to the father.
Id. For a history and analysis of the tender years doctrine, see Roth, The Tender Years Jresump-
tion in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAm. LAw 423 (1976-77).
15. See Ramey, Stender & Smaller, supra note 5, at 564 & n.26 (listing eighteen jurisdictions
which have recently rejected the tender years doctrine by statute); Developments in the Lan-The
Constitution and the Famiiy, supra note 1, at 1334 (at least twenty-eight jurisdictions have rejected
the doctrine by court decision and twelve more have enacted legislation barring the use of gender
as a factor in determining child custody); Foster & Freed, Divorce in the 50 States-An Overview as
of1978, 13 FAM. L.Q. 105, 123-25 (1979) (listing twenty-seven jurisdictions that have rejected the
tender years doctrine and ten that have "de-sexed" custody decisions); Roth, supra note 14, at 442-
48.
16. 577 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Okla. 1978).
17. 615 P.2d 301 (Okla. 1980).
18. Id. at 303. The statute was called a guideline and "tie-breaker." Although the court
unanimously modified the decree, Justice Hodges, joined by two other justices, found the tender
years presumption blatantly discriminatory on its face and as applied.
I cannot concur with that part of the opinion which states "30 O.S. 1971 § 11 is not a
gender-based discrimination statute."
The trend in legislation [The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, OKLA. STAT,
tit. 10, § 1605(D) (1981)], legal commentary, and judicial decisions is to abandon fixed
rigidity [sic] of the tender years presumption in favor of a flexible and unbiased consider-
ation based solely on the best interest of the children ....
The gender preference rule is sexually discriminatory on its face and discriminatory
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 18 [1982], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol18/iss1/6
19821 JOINT CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
tender years presumption, by its own provisions, guides the court only
and is not mandatory in the face of better alternatives for the child.19
The other, probably controlling, custodial standard is the "best in-
terests of the child."2° Seemingly, if joint custody meets the statutory
standard of the best interests of the child, it would be a legitimate
alternative.21
The Oklahoma Supreme Court recently recognized the possible
appropriateness of joint custody arrangements in Rice v. Rice.22 While
modifying a joint custody arrangement by awarding sole custody to the
father, the court nevertheless acknowledged that joint custody would
be preferable in some circumstances.23 The custody arrangement in
Rice may actually have been a divided custody arrangement, although
the trial court termed it joint custody; the trial court awarded "reason-
able visitation rights and joint custody of the child to both parties on a
two-week rotating schedule."24 In modifying the custody arrangement,
the supreme court spoke only to the problems created by the physical
rotation of the children on a two-week basis, finding that it created
instability and prevented adequate medical care for a chronically ill
child.25 It can be inferred from the court's opinion that, had it viewed
"joint custody" as continuing legal responsibility and rights in both
as applied by the courts. It is unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection to both
sexes.
Id. at 304 (footnote omitted) (Hodges, J., concurring in result).
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1981).
20. Id.; OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §§ 1601-1627 (1981) (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act).
The UCCJA provides that "[t]he controlling criteria for awarding custody by a court of this state
shall always be what is in the best interest of the child, other statutory provisions merely being
factors which may be considered." Id. at § 1605(D). Not a part of the uniform act, this provision
was added by the Oklahoma legislature in adopting the UCCJA. At least one justice has inter-
preted this as a possible legislative disavowal of the tender years presumption. See Boyle v. Boyle,
615 P.2d 301, 304 (Okla. 1980) (Hodges, J., concurring in result). f
21. In fact, the door is left open specifically by a provision anticipating the appointment by
the court of joint guardians. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 17 (1981) (which anticipates that there
may be two or more joint guardians).
22. 603 P.2d 1125 (Okla. 1979). In dicta, the Rice court took a rather broad view of the
possibility of joint custody, stating that
[t]he question of custody, joint or otherwise, must be decided by reference to the conse-
quences for the particular child in each case. The primary contemplation must always
be the welfare and best interests of the child. An award of joint child custody is a viable
alternative for courts to consider when favorable circumstances are present so that it
probably will work.
Id. at 1129 (footnote omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1128 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 1128-29. Citing recent commentary and specifically concurring with a previous
appellate decision, the court's opinion embodied elements of both joint custody and divided cus-
tody in its standards. Id. at 1129. Because of the court's choice of criteria, some lawyers view Rice
5
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parents, it might have upheld joint legal custody, while modifying the
physical custody aspect of the trial judge's order.
Rice is an example of the confusion of custodial terms and of the
need for delineating the advantages and disadvantages of the various
alternatives so that courts making custodial determinations may do so
with a clearer understanding of the likely effects of their decisions.
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF JOINT CUSTODY
To determine whether joint custody is a reasonable alternative in
given circumstances, it should be viewed "not in comparison to an ide-
alized intact family, but rather relative to the less than ideal alterna-
tives."26 Studies have identified the many adverse effects on children
caused by a parent's absence,27 whatever the cause. It has also been
shown that "children who fared best after divorce were those who were
free to develop loving and full relationships with both parents. 28
The single distinguishing characteristic of joint custody is that
both parents continue, whether physically with the child or not, to have
legal rights and responsibilities with regard to the child. This factor
gives rise to most of the advantages of joint custody.
One major advantage of joint custody is that both parents can feel
satisfied with their roles as parents, since the arrangement neither ban-
ishes one parent nor overburdens the other.29 Joint custody provides
"recognition of each parent's equal need and ability to parent children,
and the importance of both the father and the mother""0 and allows the
child to feel "rooted in relation to both parents and to continue to value
as a decided constraint on the use of joint custody in Oklahoma. Interview with William Hood,
practicing divorce lawyer (Jan. 1982).
The appellate case the supreme court relied upon, Spencer v. Spencer, 567 P.2d 112 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1977), used the term "split custody" but actually dealt with divided custody. The appellate
court stated, in dicta only, that a division of legal custody on a daily, weekly, or weekend basis was
"impractical, if not impossible." Id. at 113-14.
26. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 581.
27. See Miller, supra note 2, at 358 (citing various studies on parental absence); see also Kelly
& Wallerstein, The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Child in Early Latency, 46(1)
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 20 (1976). This study found that the central event of the divorce pro-
cess for most children was the separation of their parents, which a child often perceives as one
parent departing from him personally. Id. at 21-22. In addition, the children experienced a great
sense of loss, expressing themselves in a manner similar to grief for a dead parent. This reaction
was found regardless of the quality of the pre-divorce parent-child relationship. Id. at 26.
28. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 2, at 18 (emphasis in original).
29. See id at 104; Ramey, Stender & Smaller, supra note 5, at 575; Miller, supra note 2, at
356.
30. W. WisHnARD & L. WisHARD, supra note 6, at 202.
[Vol. 18:159
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each relationship."' 3I Although some of these benefits are available
through liberal visitation privileges, continued joint legal responsibility
adds a dimension of "legal recognition of [the] right [of both parents] to
participate in their child's life and assurance that the other parent does
not have unequal power. ' 32
Furthermore, joint custody lessens the possibility of hostility over
visitation rights. Visitation rights afforded under the typical sole cus-
tody arrangement may be used by the custodial parent as a weapon.33
Sole custody
stacks the deck against mutual cooperation. . . . The decree
then serves as a disincentive for continuing accord and mu-
tual accommodation. Fair negotiation during the dynamics
of family reorganization requires equal legal power and sanc-
tions. Neither parent should have the right, when both are
capable, to "give" or "take" custody at their whim 4.3
Because it recognizes the "equal-status of the parents, but also provides
a standard of expected behavior to guide the parents following di-
vorce," 35 a joint custody arrangement is less likely to contribute to any
potential hostility between the parents.
Joint custody is more flexible than sole custody since it allows par-
ents to jointly decide what is best for their children as changes may
warrant. Joint custody may thus eliminate some reasons for returning
to court.3 6 For instance, variances in children's ages and activity sched-
ules as they get older may dictate changes in physical custody sched-
ules, as may changes in a parent's schedule. A joint custody
arrangement gives parents the flexibility to handle these changes with-
out either "giving up" custody of the children.
As well as flexibility in physical custody, the joint custody arrange-
31. M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, SUpra note 2, at 120. See also Abarbanel, SUpra note 3, at 323
(study of joint custody families indicated that "[n]one of the children seemed to experience the
severe loss of one parent reported in traditional custodial arrangements, yet all missed 'the other
parent' (i.e., the one they were not with at the moment).").
32. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 569. See Wilcox v. Wilcox, 7 FAm. L. REP. (BNA)
2193, 2198 (Feb. 3, 1981) (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1980). But see Foster & Freed, supra note 4, at
31 (characterizing the desire for joint legal custody as "oneupmanship" or "status-seeking").
33. See Ramey, Stender & Smaller, supra note 5, at 570. The visitation rights of the non-
custodial parent are often subject to the benevolence and caprice of the other. Furthermore, sole
custody, in those cases where both parents are equally fit, gives one of two persons all the legal
authority and, according to at least one commentator, provides a clear signal to the children that
one parent is right and one is wrong. Miller, supra note 2, at 355-56.
34. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 569-70.
35. Id. at 570.
36. See id. at 572.
1982]
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ment may be advantageous in terms of quality of time. If a parent feels
better about his continuing parental role and has not been proclaimed a
"visitor," the time spent with the children may be more comfortable
and meaningful.3 7 The atmosphere in both homes should increase the
child's sense of security and stability.38 Another purported advantage
of joint custody is that it may reduce the default rate on child support
payments 39 since the parents' regular contact with the children 40 and
continuation of the legal role as parents41 create the incentive to pro-
vide for the children's needs and allow a realistic appraisal of the costs
of childrearing.42
One practical advantage of a joint custody arrangement is that
either parent can authorize medical care for the child. In the typical
sole custody arrangement, the non-custodial parent has no legal rights
with regard to the child's care and cannot authorize emergency medical
care without a consent form signed by the custodial parent.
A commonly stated disadvantage of joint custody is that it is dis-
ruptive to the child, in terms of time, inconsistency of discipline, and
conflicts in loyalty.4 3 However, physical custody is also disrupted in
sole custody arrangements by the absent parent's visitation rights.
Rigid rotation schedules are the source of most of the criticism of di-
vided custody as well as joint custody arrangements." The argument
against disruption is not an argument against joint legal custody, but an
argument for reasonable physical custody schedules geared to the
child's needs. Generally, any disruptive effects must be weighed
against the advantages of enhancing the parent-child relationship.
Another criticism of joint custody is that inconsistency in disci-
pline may confuse the child. Yet, inconsistency of discipline is not a
greater problem in a joint custody arrangement than in any other cus-
tody arrangement where the child spends some time with each parent.
Because it anticipates some degree of communication between the par-
ents, joint custody may actually reduce potential inconsistencies. One
commentator has pointed out that different standards in each home
37. Abarbanel reports that the children in her study ofjoint custody arrangements "reported
that they lived in two homes and that they felt 'at home' in both." Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 323.
38. Bratt, supra note 3, at 298.
39. Miller, supra note 2, at 365.
40. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 564.
41. Miller, supra note 2, at 365.
42. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 564.
43. See Roman & Haddad, supra note 8, at 99.
44. See Bratt, supra note 3, at 300.
[Vol. 18:159
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may not be overly burdensome to children since different standards of
behavior are expected in different locations and times in a child's life,
and parents in an intact family are not always consistent in disciplinary
matters.45 Further, since parental responsibilities continue for both
parents, each parent may be more willing to exercise discipline, and the
children may be more likely to respond.
Conflicts in loyalty may be fewer in joint custody arrangements
than in other types of arrangements. Again, the fact that both parents
continue as the child's legal custodian may reduce the child's loyalty
conflicts by assuring him of continuing contact with both parents. Joint
custody may also decrease the possibility of either parent fostering a
loyalty conflict.
The second cited disadvantage of joint custody is that parents who
could not agree during their marriage are unlikely to cooperate in rais-
hag the children. Parental conflict is a major concern of domestic rela-
tions judges. Even judges sympathetic to the concept of joint custody
foresee serious problems arising from both non-consensual and consen-
sual joint custody arrangements when the parents later disagree on a
particular issue.46 Repeated returns to court are seen as the likely way
to resolve such disputes.
Although such concerns are not without merit, the concept of joint
custody does not require that both parents agree on everything. Noth-
ing in the concept of joint custody requires both parents to sign each
report card or consent form for medical care. It merely authorizes that
either may do so. Arguably, joint custody and its necessity for coopera-
tion may increase communication about important decisions between
the parents. Unlike a sole custody arrangement, joint custody may en-
hance the amount of communication. It may also be that parents can
put aside their own differences for a child's wellbeing.47 Further, where
both parents have legally recognized rights, they may be less likely to
try to take advantage of one another.48
45. See id. at 305; Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 325 (discrepancies do not become overly bur-
densome as long as "each household has a consistency and continuity of its own and each
welcomes the child to his or her place in that household.").
46. One judge described the not unrealistic scenario in which one parent insists that the child
needs braces and the other absolutely forbids it. Interviews with Daniel Boudreau, Deborah
Shallcross, and Alan Klein, Tulsa District Court Judges (Oct. 1981).
47. See Greif, supra note 3, at 33.
48. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 580. Even cooperative parents may disagree and
find it helpful to have "legal definition[s] of their rights, responsibilities, and the parameters of
their parenting relationship." Id. at 569. Several commentators and at least two courts have even
taken the position that the parents need not both seek joint custody in order for it to work. See id;
1982]
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Arguably, an additional disadvantage is that joint custody calls
into question the time-honored practice of awarding child support to
the sole custodian. The fear of losing child support may be a barrier to
a joint custody agreement.49 Joint custody does not necessarily elimi-
nate the need for child support, but probably necessitates its reevalua-
tion based on individual circumstances.
IV. FACTORS IN RECOMMENDING JOINT CUSTODY
Since joint custody is a preferable arrangement in certain circum-
stances, why is its use not more prevalent? One answer is that the con-
cept has only recently been publicized and "popularized."' 0 While
Oklahoma statutes do not contain a presumption against joint custody,
there is no doubt that a practical presumption exists against it.5 1 The
presumption favors one parent being designated as the legal custodian
and the other as a visitor. Overcoming this presumption is a formida-
ble task. It is suggested that the only way to accomplish this task is to
create the opposite presumption--one in favor of joint custody.52
Greif, supra note 3, at 33; Wilcox v. Wilcox, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2197, 2198 (Feb. 3, 1981)
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 1980); Beck v. Beck, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1151, 1151 (Aug. 4, 1981)
(N.J. Sup. Ct. July 2, 1981) ("The parents' opposition to such an arrangement does not necessarily
preclude a court from ordering it .. "). While this may seem to be a revolutionary viewpoint, it
may be fairer than allowing one uncooperative parent to deprive the other parent of parental
status or to force the court to relieve him of parental status as punishment for not cooperating.
Although a court-ordered joint custody arrangement may be more prone to failure than one
agreed to by the parents, it is not more prone to failure, in terms of benefits to the child, than a
sole custody award following a custody battle. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 579. One
study has shown that even where parties did not seek joint custody, and in some cases bitterly
opposed it, the longer they continued the arrangement, the better they liked it. Greif, supra note 3,
at 33.
49. Interview with Arthur Rubin, practicing divorce lawyer (Jan. 1982). See Ramey, Stender
& Smaller, supra note 5, at 568.
50. The recent popular movie, Kramer v. Kramer, in which a father assumes responsibility
for his son when the mother leaves and later battles her for continued custody, is seen as a factor
in the increase in the number of fathers looking at custodial alternatives. Interview with William
Hood, practicing divorce lawyer (Jan. 1982).
51. Bratt, supra note 3, at 294, states, "The effect of the court's operational assumption in a
divorce proceeding is to create a presumption against joint custody." Bratt points out that even in
dependent/neglect proceedings, where the outcome is a termination of the legal rights of the par-
ent, the parent receives the benefit of a presumption in his favor. Id.
52. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 2, at 173. Currently, only two states provide
for a statutory presumption in favor ofjoint custody. See CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 4600, 4600.5 (West
Supp. 1982); MICH. COMp. LAws § 722.23 (Supp. 1982-83). For an analysis of the California
statute, see Comment, California'r Presumption Favoring Joint Child Custody: California Civil Code
Sections 4600 and 4600.5, 17 CAL. W.L. REv. 286 (1981). At least five other states expressly
permit joint custody by statute. Id. at 310-12 n.175 (listing those states as Wisconsin, Iowa,
Maine, North Carolina, and Oregon). In other states, like Oklahoma, joint custody is probably
permissible under statutes and case law, thus opening the door to a judicial presumption in favor
of the arrangement. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
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By instituting a judicial presumption in favor of joint custody, trial
judges would be using their authority to "discourage parents from com-
peting for sole custody and instead to encourage them to negotiate co-
operative arrangements."53 Although a presumption in favor of joint
custody might be seen as coercive, it is no more so than the current bias
in favor of sole custody. 4 There are those who argue, however, that
presumptions of any kind should be avoided55 and, instead, that judges
making custody decisions should decide "on the basis of detached, ra-
tional analysis that conforms to the best available understanding of the
behavioral sciences-not on the basis of outmoded preconceptions and
prejudices."56
Before judges can have a reasonable opportunity to make in-
formed and rational decisions, the issue must be put before them. This
means that one or both of the parties to a divorce should consider joint
custody as an alternative and lawyers should recognize its advantages
sufficiently to present them, both to clients and judges. Lawyers unfa-
miliar with alternative custody arrangements and zealous in their ad-
versarial role are seen as stumbling blocks to change by perpetuating
"either/or" thinking.5 7 A preferable approach is for lawyers to inform
the parties that there are alternatives to the "isolation of sole custody
and the bitterness of custody litigation."58
From the scant appellate guidance in this new area and sparse sci-
entific research to support the choice of one form of custody over an-
other, lawyers, judges, and even the parties themselves may be
reluctant to strike out in search of alternative custody arrangements.
Removing this impediment will be a slow process, requiring continuing
efforts by lawyers and trial judges to present related issues to appellate
courts and achieve some definitions of terms and clarification of cus-
tody alternatives for Oklahoma.
As a starting point, it is helpful to identify those factors lawyers
53. Trombetta, supra note 5, at 229.
Instead of a win or lose, all or nothing presumption, there must be a presumption of
consensus, equality and the protection of parent-child bonding. The courts in effect must
say to parents, "'We don't care how you feel about each other. As long as there is no
clear, convincing evidence that either of you is abusive and unfit to be a parent, our
assumption is that you are both qualified to continue as parents, albeit under different
circumstances."
Id. at 231.
54. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 2, at 177.
55. See 5 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2144 (Dec. 19, 1978).
56. Roth, supra note 14, at 462.
57. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, supra note 2, at 164-65; Greif, supra note 3, at 32.
58. Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 581.
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and judges may use in determining whether divorcing parents are can-
didates for joint custody. Recalling that the major distinguishing char-
acteristic of joint custody is continued parental rights and
responsibilities, it is possible to isolate a list of factors which must be
present for joint custody to be a preferable alternative to sole custody.59
Conspicuously absent from this list are factors associated with the
physical custody aspect of joint custody, including geographic proxim-
ity, similarity of environment, number and ages of the children, and the
location preference of the child. These factors should be considered
when designing a physical custody arrangement, but they do not bear
on the feasibility of joint legal custody.
Factors necessary to successful joint custody include:
1. Both parents must be fit; that is, both must be sane
and capable of making rational decisions about the child.
2. Both parents must wish to continue in their parental
roles and be willing to provide love and care to the child.6"
3. Both parents must be able to communicate and coop-
erate sufficiently to reach reasonable decisions about the
child.
4. Each parent must trust the other to love and care for
the child.6
5. The parents must share values and child-rearing phi-
losophies, at least to some degree.
6. Both parents must understand and agree with the
rules of the arrangement, whether by agreement or by court
order.62
If these six factors are substantially present, joint custody may be a
better alternative, for all concerned, than sole custody.
V. GUIDELINES FOR THE ARRANGEMENT
Although an advantage of joint custody is its flexibility, the ar-
rangement should begin with a fairly detailed agreement or court order
to set the tone for the arrangement and guide the parents as to their
59. See Miller, supra note 2, at 369-74; Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 579; Abarbanel,
supra note 3, at 325-26.
60. See Trombetta, supra note 5, at 232 (noting that joint custody would not be appropriate
where "one parent relinquishes custody voluntarily or both parents agree that sole custody is
preferable"); Foster & Freed, supra note 4, at 31.
61. See Miller, supra note 2, at 370 ("[A]ll that is necessary is the ability to accept the ex-
spouse's capacity for positively influencing the children.").
62. See Abarbanel, supra note 3, at 325-26 (finding this the most critical factor).
[Vol. 18:159
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respective rights and responsibilities. 63
At a minimum, the relationship between the parties should be de-
fined. It should be clear that each parent continues to have legal paren-
tal rights and responsibilities. From that point, the degree of specificity
will vary, but the agreement or court order also should contain the
following:'
1. A delineation of which decisions will be made jointly
and which can be made by either parent.
2. An initial physical custody schedule which meets the
current needs of the parents and the child and a provision for
how that schedule may be changed.
3. Specific financial arrangements, including child sup-
port, if any, and how expenses generally will be borne.
4. An agreement as to what type of feedback is ex-
pected between the parents.
5. The means to be used to resolve disputes, should any
arise.6 s
A carefully considered agreement will not necessarily keep the
parents in a joint custody arrangement out of court, but it may help.
Ultimately, issues may arise which are amenable only to judicial
resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Much of the available information on the subject of joint custody
is based largely upon opinion or speculation. However, it seems clear
that joint custody may be appropriate in many cases. New research
will help resolve many of the questions surrounding the issue, but such
research will be possible only if more families select joint custody.
Fully understood, joint custody is a reasonable alternative for
Oklahoma judges to order and for Oklahoma lawyers to seek for their
clients.
Nancy Glisan Gourley
63. See Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 574-76.
64. See W. WisHARD & L. WIsHiARD, supra note 6, at 210-12; Miller, supra note 2, at 390-93;
Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 574.
65. Several commentators suggest a mediation clause. See, e.g., W. WisARD & L.
WISHARD, supra note 6, at 212; Folberg & Graham, supra note 3, at 572-74; Miller, supra note 2, at
401; Trombetta, supra note 5, at 227-29.
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